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H. J. HEINZ Co. v. SuPERIOR CouRT

[S. F. No. 18605.

In Bank.

[42 C.2d

Jan. 29, 1954.]

H. J. HEINZ COMPANY (a Corporation), Petitioner, v.
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF ALAMEDA COUNTY
et al., Respondents.
[1] Patents-Actions-Infringement- Injunctive Relief.-Where
complaint in patent owner's action to enjoin defendant from
making and using patented vinegar generators alleged that
defendant threatened to exercise rights under an invalid license
and threatened to build generators of character covered by
patent, and court in its judgment declared that defendant had
no right to build generators covered by patent and that defendant was Testrainecl from asserting or claiming "the right
or license" to build or operate vinegar generators of type
covered by patent other than one vinegar generator installed
by plaintiff at defendant's factory, effect of judgment was that
defendant was enjoined not only from exercising any rights
under license but also any right to build generators covered by
patent independent of license.
[2] Id.-Actions-Jurisdiction.-A state court has jurisdiction in
equity action to cancel and set aside license agreement to use
a patent where there is also involved, and judgment includes,
an injunction against threatened infringement of patent, since
the federal statute (28 U.S.C. § 1338 (a)),
that federal
district court has exclusive jurisdiction of "action [s]" arising
under federal patent law, does not purport to cover all patent
right "question [ s J" which may arise in some other kind of
"action" or "case" such as one based on common law or equity;
hence the latter actions are within jurisdiction of state courts.
[3] Id.-Actions-Jurisdiction.-Where patentee complainant asks
aid of court in declaring forfeiture of a license or in restoring
unclouded title to patent, he does not give federal district court
jurisdiction of cause as one arising under patent laws; nor
may he confer such jurisdiction by adding to his bill an averment that after forfeiture shall be declared or title to patent
shall be restored, he fears that defendant will infringe and
therefore asks an injunction to prevent it.
[2] Jurisdiction of state court over actions involving patents,
note, 167 A.L.R. 1114. See, also, Cal.Jur., Patents, § 7; Am.Jur.,
Patents, §§ 169, 170.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Patents, § 9; [2, 3] Patents, § 8;
[ 4-6, 8, 9] Contempt, § 63; [7] Contempt, § 3; [10, 11] Injunctions,
§ 101; [12] Injunctions, § 102.
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has no authority
damages resulting
in a
from violation of
[5] Id.--Punisl:ment-Limitations as to Extent.-~-Code Civ. Proc.,
§
i1ne may be
on him [one
guilty of
not
ilve hundred dollars, or he
may be
not
five
or both," and
§ 1219,
imprisonment as a coercive measure where
contempt consists of refusal to perform ordered
establish
limits within which a court may punish for contempt.
[6]
there is no statutory
injured person's
rights
protected through reby
statutory law; civil damcourse to remedies
ages may be collected m an ordinnry civil action for an act
otherwise a contempt.
[7] Id.-Nature and Purpose of Court's Power.-Enforcement of
an order of contempt is not for vindication of a private right
but is for maintenance of dignity and authority of court, and
to preserve peace and dignity of people of the state.
[8] Id..-Prmishment-A.dequacy of Statutory Provisions.-Insofar
as contempt is against authority of court, Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 1218, limiting extent of punishment for contempt, is adequate
to compel enforcement of its order since each day's violation
is a separate offense.
[9] Id.-Punishment-Damages.-To allow compensatory damages
in a contempt proceeding would have effect of turning it into
an action for damages, and in such action the parties are
ordinarily entitled to a trial by jury and an appeal, neither
of which may be accorded petitioner in a contempt proceeding.
[10] Injunctions-Violation-Affidavit.-Affidavit initiating a contempt proceeding for violation of injunction decreeing that
defendant had no right or license to build or use vinegar
generators of type covel'ed by plaintiff's patent was sufficient
to confer jurisdiction on trial court where, in addition to
stating some things to effect that affiant was so informed and
believed, it squarely stated that defendant's conduct was a
violation of injunction, and where sufficient facts were set
forth, namely, that defendant had built and used generators
covered by plaintiff's patent contrary to terms of injunction.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 1211.)
[11] Id.-Violation--Affidavit.-Facts peculiarly within knowledge
of one charged with violating an injunction may be on information and belief.

[ 5] See Cal.Jur.2d, Contempt, § 42; Am.Jur., Contempt, § 61

et seq.
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[12] !d.-Violation- Hearing and Determination.-In contempt
proceeding for violation of injunction decreeing that defendant
had no right or license to build or use vinegar generators of
type covered by plaintiff's patent, court's order directing destruction of generators is supportable as a method of preventing defendant from further violating injunction.

PROCEEDING in certiorari to review an order of the
Superior Court of Alameda County adjudging licensee guilty
of contempt of court, awarding compensatory damages to
patent owner, and ordering destruction of patented vinegar
generators. Portion of order awarding compensatory damages, annulled; portion of order directing destruction of
generators, affirmed.
Chickering & Gregory, William H. Parmelee, Frederick
M. Fisk, Paul M. Duff, Moses Lasky, Christy, Parmelee &
Strickland, Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison and Herman Phleger
for Petitioner.
Morris Lowenthal, Juliet Lowenthal and Karl D. Lyon for
Respondents.
CARTER, J.-This is a review of an order made after
proceedings in contempt for violation of an injunction issued
in an action in which Charles Owens was plaintiff, hereafter
referred to as plaintiff, and H. J. Heinz Company, a corporation, petitioner here, was defendant, hereafter referred to as
defendant.
In 1943, plaintiff commenced the above-mentioned action for
declaratory and injunctive relief against defendant, charging
that he was the owner of a patent for a vinegar generator; that
a license agreement from plaintiff to defendant to use the
patent in making and using the generator was obtained by
fraud and lacked consideration. A declaration of the invalidity and unenforceability of the license was asked, together
with a declaration that defendant had no right to build or
use the patented generators, but threatened to do so, and
should be restrained from asserting any claims under the
license. On December 21, 1944, the court gave judgment in
that action declaring the license invalid and unenforceable;
that plaintiff owned the patent and defendant had no right
to build or use generators of the character covered by plaintiff's patent. Defendant was enjoined from asserting any
right under the license or any right to build or use the gen-
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erator covered by the patent other than one at its plant in
Berkeley, California. That judgment became and is final.
In September, 1949, plaintiff filed in that action an affidavit stating that the court had issued an injunction wherein
it was adjudged and decreed that defendant had no right or
license to build or use vinegar generators of the type covered
by plaintiff's patent and that the purported license given by
plaintiff to defendant was invalid; that the judgment provided
(stating the exact words of the injunction) that notwithstanding the injunction plaintiff is "informed" that defendant has
built and used the generators covered by plaintiff's patent;
that in correspondence with defendant in June of 1949, the
latter did not deny that it had built and installed generators
but did deny that it violated plaintiff's rights; that when
plaintiff was installing a generator at defendant's Berkeley
plant the latter's agent took pictures and sketches thereof,
and during the installation, one of plaintiff's assembly prints
disappeared and plaintiff believes the agent took it; that plaintiff believes defendant has appropriated his patent and is
claiming the right to make and use generators covered thereby;
that defendant's conduct is in violation of the injunction.
Pursuant to the affidavit the court issued an order reciting
that it appeared that defendant had been making and using
generators in violation of the injunction and directing defendant to show cause why an order should not be made holding
it in contempt of court for violating the injunction and why
there should not be made such other orders as may be required
to "correet" the violations. Defendant filed a return to the
order to show cause (later amended) asserting insufficiency
of plaintiff's affidavit, the lack of jurisdiction of the court
in granting· the injunction because it involved patent rights
over which the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction, and
denying that it had built or used generators of the type covered by the patent. Defendant moved to vacate the order to
show cause and to modify the injunction by striking out the
provisions thereof restraining it from building and using generators of the type covered by the patent, asserting that they
invaded the jurisdiction of the federal courts.
The court made an "interlocutory order" reciting the foregoing and that it had denied defendant's motions; that the
judgment in the action was res judicata of defendant's claims
of lack of jurisdiction; that defendant was estopped to assert
lack of jurisdiction; and that the sole issue was whether the
injunction had been violated. The court made findings on
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those matters and also that the issues in the action embraced
the right, if any, of defendant to build and use the generators
in ·dew of
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ordered that the
was in civil contempt and the
relief granted was rcn1edial and not fol' punishment for wilful
disobedience of the
; that
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to make further orders to carry out its order.
Defendant's n:min contentions are: That the court had no
jurisdiction to grant the injunction in the action nor entertain the
because they involved patent
rights within the exclusive jurisdiction of tl1e federal courts
and hence it could not
be held in contempt for violating the
; tbat the court had no authority to award
to plaintiff, in the
proceedings, compensatory damfrom the Yiolation of the injunction.
of jurisdiction to grant the injunetion in
the action and entertain the
proceedings, it should
be noted that the Constitution of the United States provides
that
shall have pOIYer ''To promote the progress of
science ann useful
for limited times to ...
to their
. . . discoveries." CU. S. Const., art. I, § 8 ( 8), and pursuant thereto
Congrefls has provided by statute that : ''The [federal] district
courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action aris-
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ing under any Act of Congress relating to patents, copyrights
and trade-marks. Such jurisdiction shall be exclusive of the
courts of the states in patent and copyright cases." (28
U.S.C.A., § 1338 (a).) Before coming to the question of the jurisdiction of the court to grant injunctive relief in the judgment
rendered in the action, other things must be considered.
[1] Defendant claims that the action, and ensuing judgment granting plaintiff injunctive relief against defendant,
dealt only with conduct by it in claiming and exercising a
right under the license agreement to build and use the generators; that the court did not enjoin it from infringing plaintiff's patent independent of the license, but in the contempt
proceeding the court construed the injunctive provisions in
the judgment as prohibiting infringement as well as claiming
rights under the license, and that so interpreted, the court
lacked jurisdiction to render the judgment with its injunctive
provisions because of the exclusive federal court jurisdiction.
It is true that the complaint in the action charges that defendant threatens to exercise rights under the license, which plaintiff asserts is invalid, by building generators of the character
covered by the patent, but it is also alleged that defendant
threatens to build generators of the character covered by
plaintiff's patent and, by so doing, is causing depreciation of
the value of plaintiff's patent. In the prayer it is asked that
it be declared that defendant has no right to build generators
of the type covered by plaintiff's patent and that it be enjoined
from claiming any rights under the patent and claiming any
right to build generators covered by plaintiff's patent. Fairly
interpreted, the complaint demands that the license be set aside
and, prevailing on that issue, relief be granted for infringement. Defendant, in its answer, denied it had no right to
build generators covered by the patent. In its findings the
court stated that plaintiff was the owner of the patent; that
the license was void; that a controversy existed between the
parties concerning defendant's right to build generators covered by the patent and concerning the effect of the license;
that defendant threatens to exercise and claim rights under
the license and to build generators covered by the patent, which
will cause depreciation in the value of the patent. In its judgment the court declared defendant has no right to build generators covered by the patent and that defendant is restrained
"from asserting or claiming the right or license to build or
have built for itself or to maintain or operate vinegar generators of the type, kind or character covered by any Letters
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Patent [issued to] ... plaintiff ... , other than the one vinegar
generator installed by plaintiffs at the [defendant's] . . .
factory in Berkeley, California." (Emphasis added.) Thus
it is clear enough that defendant was enjoined not only from
exercising any rights under the license but also any right to
build generators covered by the patent independent of the license. Moreover, it was determined by the trial court (the same
judge who tried the action) in the contempt proceedings that
the injunction embraced infringement of the patent. It found
in its "interlocutory order" in the contempt proceedings
heretofore mentioned: ''The allegations and prayer in the
complaint [in the action] for declaratory relief and the evidence produced at the trial were not confined to the existence
of the alleged license but went beyond said 'license' on plaintiff's contention that the defendant H. J. Heinz Company
claimed the right and had been threatening to make generators of the kind covered by Owens' patents, independently of
the alleged 'license.' It clearly appears that this action as
filed and prosecuted by plaintiffs was not confined solely to
the validity of said 'license' but was equally concerned with
the threats made by the defendants, both under the license
and independent of the license, to build and operate vinegar
generators of the kind and character covered by the said letters
patent owned by Charles H. Owens, everywhere in the world
and without paying any consideration therefor. It also appears that one of the issues raised by the plaintiffs' complaint,
as well as by defendants' answer thereto, was whether or not
this Court would decree and declare that the H. J. Heinz
Company had no right of future infringement of the Owens
patents and had no right in the future to erect generators,
whether under the alleged license or otherwise, of the kind
covered by said plaintiff's patents . . . .
''The said answer filed by defendants did raise a question
requiring an original interpretation by the Court of the scope
and claims of the Letters Patent No. 2,089,412, owned by plaintiff Charles H. Owens, by contending and asserting that the
said generator installed at the Berkeley plant was not identical
with and similar to, in every respect, the Owens installation at
the plant of the Frank Tea & Spice Co., Cincinnati, Ohio, and
susceptible of operation in the same manner as the Frank
installation was operated . . . . In said answer defendant H. J.
Heinz Company asserted the right to build and erect generators
of the type covered by the aforesaid patent of plaintiff not only
upon the basis of the alleged 'license' of November 25, 1941,
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but also upon the basis of an alleged oral agreement claimed
to have been made with plaintiffs prior to August 28, 1940....
The answer further affirmed that the H. J. Heinz Company
claimed the right to build and have built for itself and to
operate vinegar generators of the type, kind and character
covered by the letters patent owned by Charles H. Owens and
the answer admitted that a justiciable controversy existed between Owens and said defendant company on that subject ....
''As appears from said judgment and decree and as intended
by this Court, based upon and pursuant to the issues raised
by plaintiffs' complaint and by defendants' answer and by
the evidence, the said decree and injunction of this Court was
not confined to the limited question of the existence or validity
of the alleged 'license' agreement and any rights of defendant
thereunder, but perpetually prohibited the defendant H. J.
Heinz Company from either asserting the right to build or
from building or erecting or operating such Owens Giant Type
Generators, irrespective of whether the defendant company
asserted a license from Owens to do so.'' On several occasions
during various proceedings in the trial court defendant in
effect conceded that the infringement issue was adjudicated.
The United States Court of Appeals passed upon that question of interpretation. After the contempt proceedings were
initiated defendant sought declaratory relief in federal district
court to enjoin plaintiff from prosecuting those proceedings
in the superior court on the ground that the state court had
no jurisdiction. Judgment was rendered in the federal district court against defendant and it appealed to the United
States Court of Appeals. That court affirmed the judgment
(II. J. Heinz Co. v. Owens, 189 F.2d 505, cert. den. 342
U.S. 905 [72 S.Ct. 294, 96 L.Ed. 677]), reciting the facts as
to the injunctive provisions of the judgment as above mentioned and stating that the injunction restrained an infringement on the patent. Defendant had claimed lack of jurisdiction in the state court. The United States Court of Appeals
held that the federal courts had no authority, by reason of
a federal statute, to enjoin a state court. Defendant moved
for a correction of the opinion, asserting that the injunctive
provisions of the judgment should not have been interpreted
as restraining infringement of the patent. In denying the
motion the court of appeals stated, defendant asserts "that
this court has misconceived the factual basis and legal holding
(Jf a state court adjudication [the injunction judgment] with
reference to the matter in controversy. In one particular,
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appellant [defendant here] is correct. Owens did not claim
and the state court did not find that Heinz had actually
infringed the Owens patent. Rather Owens claimed and the
court found only a threatened infr·ingement. However, nothing in our decision turns upon any difference between actual
infringement and threatened infringement as a basis of adjudication in the state court. 'l'he important thing is the scope
of the decree of the state court with reference to future infringement. On that point, despite appellant's renewed urging to the contrary, we understand the action of the state
court to have been as heretofore stated in our opinion in this
case." (Emphasis added; H. J. He1:nz Co. v. Owens, 191 F.2d
257.) To the same effect is an order made by the federal
district court denying a petition by defendant, after the contempt proceedings were instituted, to remove the contempt
proceedings to the federal court on the ground that the latter
and not the state court, had jurisdiction. On motion of plaintiff the proceedings were remanded to the state court.
We conclude, therefore, that the injunction action and
judgment did involve threatened infringement of the patent
as well as rights under the license and respondent court was
correct in so determining in the contempt proceedings.
The question is, therefore, whether a state court has jurisdiction in an equity action to cancel and set aside a license
agreement to use a patent, where there is also involved, and
the judgment includes, an injunction against threatened infringement of the patent in view of the provisions of article
I, section 8(8) of the Constitution of the United States and
federal statute, 28 U.S.C.A., section 1338(a), supra. In other
words, we have a case in which plaintiff, as the owner of a
patent, sought to have declared invalid, for fraud and lack
of consideration, a license given by him to defendant, and
if he was successful in that endeavor, he wanted future protection by injunction against the use of the patent by defendant, that is, infringement. We have concluded that the state
court had jurisdiction.
[2] It will be noted that the statute (28 U.S. C. A.,
§ 1338 (a), snpra) states that the federal district court has
exclusive jurisdiction of "action [s] " arising under federal
patent law. It does not purport to cover all patent right
"question[s]" which may arise in some other kind of an
''action'' or ''case'' such as one based upon common law or
equity; the latter actions manifestly are within the jurisdiction
of the state courts. As said : ''Section 711 [the predecessor
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of 28 U.S.C.A., § 1338(a), supra] does not deprive the state
courts of the power to determine questions arising under the
patent laws, but only of assuming jurisdiction of 'cases' arising
under the patent laws." (Pratt v. Paris Gaslight & Coke Co.,
168 U.S. 255, 259 [18 S.Ct. 62, 42 L.Ed. 458] .) [3] Accordingly, it is said that '' ... where a patentee complainant makes his
suit one for recovery of royalties under a contract of license or
assignment, or for damages for a breach of its covenants, or
for a specific performance thereof, or asks the aid of the Court
in declaring a forfeitur·e of the license or in restoring an unclouded title to the patent, he does not give the federal district
court jurisdiction of the cause as one arising under the patent
laws. Nor may he confer it in such a case by adding to his
bill an averment that after the forfeiture shall be declared,
or the title to the patent shall be restored, he fears the defendant will infringe and therefore asks an injunction to prevent it.
That was Wilson v. Sandford. If in that case the patentee
complainant had based his action on his patent right and had
sued for infringement, and by anticipation of a defense of the
assignment had alleged a forfeiture by his own declaration
without seeking aid of the court, jurisdiction [of the federal
district court] under the patent laws would have attached,
and he would have had to meet the claim by the defendant
that forfeiture of the license or assignment and restoration
of title could not be had except by a decree of a court, which
if sustained, would have defeated his prayer for an injunction
on the merits. But when the patentee exercises his choice and
bases his action on the contract and seeks remedies thereunder,
he may not give the case a double aspect, so to speak, and
make it a patent case conditioned on his securing equitable
relief as to the contract.'' (Emphasis added; Luckett v. Delpark, 270 U.S. 496, 510 [46 S.Ct. 397, 70 L.Ed. 703] .) (See,
also, Pendleton v. Ferguson, 15 Cal.2d 319 [101 P.2d 81, 688];
Seagren v. Smith, 63 Cal.App.2d 733 [147 P.2d 682] ; Deakins
v. Superior Court, 90 Cal.App. 630 [266 P. 563] ; Wilson v.
Sandford, 10 How.(U.S.) 99 [13 L.Ed. 344]; National Clay
Products Co. v. If eath Unit Tile Co., 40 F.2d 617; 40 Am.Jur.,
Patents, § 170.) There is no basis for any distinction based on
the claim that plaintiff may have repudiated the license before
suit. The action still was one to cancel or revoke the written
license as it was still outstanding in defendant's hands and
for the further relief against threatened patent infringement.
[4] On the question of the propriety of awarding compensatory damages, that is, damages suffered by plaintiff by
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reason of defendant's violation of the injunction, petitioner
eontends that the court had no authority in a contempt action
to award such damages. This contention must be sustained.
[5] In this state "the power of the Courts to. ptmish for
contempt has been regulated by statute . . . " since 1851
(Gallancl v. Galland, 44 Cal. 475, 478 [13 Am.Rep. '167]; Ex
parte Rowe, 7 Cal. 175, 176, 177). Section 1218 of the Code
of Civil Procedure provides that '' . . . a fine may be imposed
on him [one guilty of contempt] not exceeding five hundred
dollars, or he may be imprisoned not exceeding five days, or
both . . . . '' Section 1219 authorizes imprisonment as a coercive measure where the contempt consists of a refusal to
perform an ordered act. These provisions have been the law
since their enactment in 1851 and have been recognized by
the courts as establishing the limits within which a court may
punish for contempt. (Ex parte Cohen, 6 Cal. 318, 319, 321.)
In In re Garner·, 179 Cal. 409 [177 P. 162], it was held that
section 1218 was constitutional and that the imposition of a
penalty in excess of that prescribed by that section was an
act beyond the power of the court and therefore void.
So far as the alleged "inherent" power of the court to
award compensatory damages is concerned, section 4 of the
Code of Civil Procedure provides that the rule of the common
law that statutes in derogation thereof are to be strictly construed has no application ''to this code.'' Several cases have
set forth the rule that section 1218 is a ''limitation upon the
power formerly exercised by the court to punish for contempt''
(Galland v. Galland, supra, 44 Cal. 475, 478; In re Garner,
supm, 179 Cal. 409; Ex parte Abbott, 94 Cal. 333 [29 P. 622];
Matter of Tyler, 64 Cal. 434). We are referred to no authority
in support of the order of the trial court either in this state, or
elsewhere, where contempt proceedings are regulated by statutory provisions similar to ours, and independent research discloses none. On the other hand, Idaho and Montana, whose
Codes of Civil Procedure were taken from that of California,
have both held that their statutory provisions precluded the
courts from imposing compensatory damages for contempt.
(State ex rel. Flynn v. District Court, 24 Mont. 33 [60 P. 493] ;
Levan v. Richards, 4 Idaho 667 [43 P. 574].) Both decisions
note that their contempt statutes are the same as in California
and rely upon the California cases heretofore cited.
[6] The injured person's property rights may be adequately protected through recourse to the remedies provided
by other statutory law. In In re Morris, 194 Cal. 63, 69 [227
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P. 914], it was held that acts in contempt of court had a triple
aspect, and that "It [was] apparent upon reflection that the
same act may at the same time take on a third aspect in which
it is to be regarded as an offense against private rights, and
remediable as such by an ordinary action at law." (See, too,
Kirby v. San Francisco Sav. & Loan Soc., 95 Cal.App. 757
[273 P. 609].) In 39 California Law Review, at page 560, the
author states that ''California has no provision for compensatory contempt proceedings. Civil damages may be collected
in an ordinary civil action for an act otherwise a contempt.''
[7] The enforcement of an order of contempt in this state
is not for the vindication of a private right but is for the
maintenance of the dignity and authority of the court, and to
preserve the peace and dignity of the people of the State of
California (In re Morris, s~tpra, 194 Cal. 63, 69). [8] Insofar as the contempt is against the authority of the court, section 1218 of the Code of Civil Procedure is adequate to compel
the enforcement of its order since each day's violation is a
separate offense.
[9] To allow compensatory damages in the contempt proceeding would have the effect of turning it into an action for
damages. In an action for damages, tl1e parties are ordinarily
entitled to a trial by jury and an appeal, neither of which
has been accorded the petitioner in this proceeding.
Defendant claims that the affidavit initiating the contempt
proceeding was insufficient to confer jurisdiction on the trial
court. We have heretofore set forth its contents. The code
requires that where the contempt is outside the court's presence, the affidavit should set forth the facts constituting the
contempt. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1211.) [10] While the affidavit
does state some things in language to the effect that affiant is so
informed and believes, it is squarely stated in the last sentence
that the conduct of defendant was a violation of the injunction.
Sufficient facts were set forth, namely, that defendant had built
and used generators covered by plaintiff's patent contrary to
the terms of the injunction. [11] Facts peculiarly within the
knowledge of the one charged with violating the injunction may
be on information and belief. (Ballentine v. Superior Court, 26
Cal.2d 254 [158 P.2d 14] .) Certainly it was peculiarly within
defendant's knowledge as to what extent it was building and
using generators covered by plaintiff's patent.
Defendant makes other contentions such as that it was denied
due process of law because the court would not pass upon the
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validity of plaintiff's patent in the contempt proceedings. The
trial court found that issue was not relevant in those proceedings and that defendant had the opportunity to raise that issue
in the action in which the injunction was obtained, and not
having done so, it was res judicata.
[12] Ordering the destruction of the generators would
seem supportable as a method of preventing defendant from
further violating the injunction. It would seem that if a
person may be deprived of his liberty until he complies with
a valid judgment or order of a court, he may be required to
destroy that which he created in violation of such judgment
or order. In Morton v. Superior Court, 65 Cal. 496 [4 P. 489],
a dam was ordered removed by court order and it was also
ordered that the corporation, its officers, agents and employees
and all persons acting under it be enjoined and restrained from
continuing or maintaining the same. After its removal, pursuant to court order, one whom the court found to be an agent
of the corporation reconstructed the dam. The agent who
reconstructed the dam was ordered imprisoned until the dam
was again removed from the property. It has been recently
held that a court may order the destruction of a building
constructed in violation of a provision in the grant of a right
of way for a power line by a predecessor in interest of the
owner of the servient tenement of which the latter had
no knowledge. (Pacific Gas&; Elec. Co. v. Minnette, 115 Cal.
App.2d 698 [252 P.2d 642] .) It would seem to follow that
if such harsh consequences could flow from the unintentional
violation of a provision in a deed, similar consequences
flowing from the intentional violation of a court decree cannot
be successfully challenged.
That portion of the order awarding compensatory damages
to the plaintiff is annulled; that portion of the order directing
the destruction of 16 specified vinegar generators is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., and Traynor, J., concurred.
SCHAUER, J., Concurring.-Although the "Final Order"
in the contempt proceedings recites in Paragraph IX that the
''object and purpose of the relief prayed for by the plaintiff
and granted by this order are remedial and for the benefit
of the plaintiff and not for the purpose or by way of punishment of defendant for its wilful and knowing disobedience and
violation of the . . . decree and injunction . . ., '' nevertheless, in Paragraphs V and VI of its order wherein the court
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specifically directs that the generators in question be destroyed
and prohibits further construction, maintenance and use of
certain other g·enerators then in the course of construction, the
court expressly declares and reiterates that those particular
portions of the order (set forth in Paragraphs V and VI)
were made ''To correct and prevent further and future violations of the injunction and decree . . . . " It is thus apparent
that the provisions of Paragraph IX have particular reference
to the compensatory monetary relief awarded Mr. Owens and
do not preclude sustaining the directions contained in Paragraphs V and VI on other grounds.
The same thought was expressed by the court in its written
memorandum opinion which preceded by three days the ''Final
Order,'' and in which after determining the damages to be
awarded to plaintiff the court continues: ''The second important issue before the Court for determination is the nature
of the corrective remedial relief to be granted. . . . The award
of damages . . . will fairly and duly compensate plaintiff for
the wrongful use and operation by defendant of his patented
generators and for the unjust enrichment of the defendant ....
Such an award, however, would not and should not allow
defendant to secure the very benefits of the fraudulent 'license'
which this Court cancelled in 1944 by the decree and injunction. The continuing use by the defendant of the Owens type
generators is without authorization of this Court or of plaintiff and is a continuing violation of the decree and injunction.
Under such circumstances there is an inherent power of a
Court of equity, in a civil contempt proceeding such as this,
to grant the necessary corrective remedial relief to compel
compliance with the injunction and decree. This can be
accomplished only by the destruction and demolition of the
generators that have been constructed in violation of the
decree and by stopping all new construction. . . . " (Italics
added.)
In the memorandum opinion the court also commented that
''At the outset, it must be noted that the controversy is not
simply one involving patent infringement, but concerns thr
violation and disobedience of a final court injunction . . . . ''
(Italics added.)
And in the court's Interlocutory Order, which is expressly
made a part of the Final Order in the contempt proceedings,
it is noted that ''This proceeding is one to enforce the injunction and decree issued in the original trial of this action . . . . ''
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Since in a sense it is true that any contempt proceeding
seeking to enforce the terms of an injunction theretofore issued
in favor of a private plaintiff is for plaintiff's benefit, it appears to me that the court's express recognition of that fact
should not deprive it of the power which it was here exercising,
of compelling compliance with the injunction, and to that end
ordering destruction of generators which defendant had constructed and was using in direct, deliberate and flagrant disregard of the injunction. The court repeatedly declared that
the purpose of ordering the destruction was to enforce the
earlier injunction. I believe it had power to do so and this
view is supported by Morton v. Superior Coud (1884), 65
Cal.496 [4P.489].
For the reasons above stated I concur in the judgment and,
generally, in the reasoning of Mr. Justice Carter.
SHENK, J., Concurring and Dissenting.-! concur in the
decision of the cour~ insofar as it holds that the trial court had
jurisdiction to grant the injunction and to entertain the contempt proceedings. I am also in agreement with the holding
that the power of the court to punish for contempt is legally
limited by the provisions of section 1218 of the Code of Civil
Procedure to a fine of ''not exceeding five hundred dollars,''
or to imprisonment "not exceeding five days," or both such
fine and imprisonment. Therefore when the trial court assumed to fine the defendant $375,934.66 for offenses based on
daily violations in the past and $526 per day for continuing
daily violations, and then proceeded to direct these sums to
be paid as compensatory damages in favor of the plaintiff, an
excess of exercisable power is obvious.
Likewise the order based on the present record for the destruction of the generators valued at $160,000 was beyond the
jurisdiction of the court and should be annulled. Paragraph
IX of the order under review provides that "the object and
purpose of the relief prayed for by the plaintiff and granted
by this order are remedial and for the benefit of the plaintiff
and not for the purpose or by way of punishment of defendant
for its wilful and knowing disobedience and violation of" the
injunction. There was nothing in the injunctive order requiring the destruction of the generators. If the decree had
ordered them destroyed a situation would have been presented
similar to that involved in Morton v. Superior Court, 65 Cal.
496 [4 P. 489], relied on by the majority. In that case there
was a mandatory injunction ordering the dam removed. It
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was removed but was replaced by an agent of the party enjoined. There could be no question of the power of the court
to punish the agent for contempt and order the reconstructed
dam removed. That is not this case. Here there is no order
for destruction in the judgment of injunction and the declared
purpose of the order of contempt is for the benefit of the plaintiff. In Ex Parte Gould (1893), 99 Cal. 360 [33 P. 1112, 37
Am.St.Rep. 57, 21 L.R.A. 751], this court said, at page 362,
quoting with approval from William's Case, 26 Pa.St. 19 [67
Am.Dec. 374], that the purpose of a contempt proceeding "is
not to indemnify the plaintiff for any damage he may have
sustained by reason of such misconduct, but to vindicate the
dignity and authority of the court. It is a special proceeding,
criminal in character, in which the state is the real plaintiff
or prosecutor." In recognition of this rule the majority opinion here correctly states: ''The enforcement of an order of
contempt in this state is not for the vindication of a private
right but is for the maintenance of the dignity and authority
of the court . . . . '' Nowithstanding that uniformly supported
principle an order in this contempt proceeding for the destruction of property for the benefit of the plaintiff is affirmed.
Such an order is not necessary to vindicate the power of the
court. This could be accomplished by proceedings against the
defendant for contempt under the authority and within the
limitations of section 1218 of the Code of Civil Procedure for
daily violations of the order of injunction. I would annul
the order in its entirety.
Edmonds, J., and Spence, J., concurred.
Petitioner's application for a rehearing was denied February 24, 1954. Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., and Spence, J., were
of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

